Xi's Taiwan Strategy: Breakthrough or Blunder?
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“Taiwan seems so small and indefensible. It doesn’t even have a nuclear arsenal. So why doesn’t China invade and take it over? More importantly, why didn’t Mao take over Taiwan and eradicate the Guomindang when he had the chance during the civil war?”
Ok, so the second question is easy enough to answer in brief fashion: A combination of concentration on the Korean peninsula, fears of anti-communist involvement, the lack of naval technology on the part of the PLA, and even the valiant efforts of Chiang Kai-shek’s intelligence officers kept the Republic of China (at least materially) intact. And as it turns out, the possibility of Beijing launching an invasion, let alone a successful one, is extremely low in the current geopolitical climate of Eastern Asia.
Recently, China has intensified its shows of force, increasing tensions in the Taiwan Strait. In the last month, fifty PLA aircraft have entered Taiwanese airspace, with rhetoric from official mouthpieces in Beijing similarly bellicose in nature. The United States has increasingly flirted with the idea of openly backing Taiwan and verbally committing to its defense in the event of an invasion. Yet China lacks the ability to mount an invasion of the mountainous island that lies 110 miles away from the mainland, according to most experts. In fact, these seemingly tough messages relayed from Beijing reflect how recent diplomatic strategies towards Tsai Ing-wen’s government have been met with failure rather than success.
Tsai, elected in 2016 on the Democratic Progressive Party ticket by a wide margin over Eric Chu of the traditional powerhouse of the Guomindang, has been staunchly pragmatic in her style of dealing with Beijing. The DPP has always tilted towards Taiwanese nationalism and is far more skeptical of China than the Guomindang, whose presidents made strides towards the normalization of relations with Beijing. Tsai faced pressure from her party to pursue the consolidation of an increasingly independent Taiwan, but she has held firm in her preservation of the status quo.
However, Xi Jinping’s government broke with a major precedent set by Hu Jintao: appeals to the Taiwanese public through economic and cultural exchange. Xi’s government has brushed this approach aside, adopting the harshness of anti-independence diplomacy on these softer fronts. Sustained pressure on the UN members that recognize the ROC as the legitimate government of China, foreign corporations, and fiddling with the 2020 election cycle were all elements of Beijing’s aggressive new approach to Taiwan. But the strategy failed for the most part. Tsai was re-elected with a share of the vote similar to that of her victory four years earlier. Her popularity had not been scarred by Beijing nor by more steadfast factions of her party.
More concerning for Xi still is the United States’ increasingly friendly relations with the Tsai government, as the Trump administration has not taken particularly kindly to Beijing’s increasingly confrontational approach to Taiwan. Washington has historically desired stability and neutrality on these matters, but the narrative is being wholly reshaped. And Tsai has intelligently chosen to align her positions with those of the United States. The hardline coercion attempts by Beijing have also alienated parts of the Taiwanese public, who identify themselves with the island they live on rather than the Chinese mainland more than ever.
In sum, the Chinese approach to Taiwan in recent years has been a surprising failure. With so much leverage lost, particularly over Washington and the people of Taiwan, Xi will likely face more uphill battles than ever in his quest to define Taiwan Strait geopolitics. Even with increased tensions in the region, Beijing has little good reason to pursue militaristic solutions. Only time will tell as to how Taiwan will interact with mainland China. With Tsai’s time in office set to end in 2024 as term limits kick in, the opportunity for a more ideological member of the DPP or a more Beijing-friendly Guomindang politician to take office is very real. Xi will likely need to return to square one in order to create an approach to Taiwan that asserts his government’s influence on both sides of the Taiwan Strait.
